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**HEADQUARTERS 12<sup>TH</sup> ARMORED DIVISION**

**APO 262, U. S. ARMY**

**OPERATIONS IN FRANCE**

**JANUARY 1945**

**23<sup>RD</sup> TANK BATTALION**

(Unit)

HEADQUARTERS 23<sup>RD</sup> TANK BATTALION

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\* Only prepared in one copy

**HEADQUARTERS 23<sup>RD</sup> TANK BATTALION**

**APO 262**

**U.S. ARMY**

10 February 1945

SUBJECT: Transmittal of Battalion History for January 1945.

TO : Commanding General, 12<sup>th</sup> Armored Division

ATTN: I & E (G-3) Section

Transmitted herewith history of 23<sup>rd</sup> Tank Battalion, 12<sup>th</sup> Armored Division for period 1 January 1945 through 31 January 1945.

/ signed /

WILLIAM A EDWARDS  
Major, Infantry, Commanding

## HEADQUARTERS 23<sup>RD</sup> TANK BATTALION

APO 262

U.S. ARMY

10 February 1945

### COMMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The following comments and recommendations for month of January is submitted herewith:

1. The 76mm gun mounted on our tanks should not be underrated as it far surpasses any of our other guns used in tanks. The blast from the muzzle when the gun is not equipped with a muzzle brake makes it extremely difficult for the Tank Commander to make an accurate sensing, making it very important that the gunner follow each round. It is recommended that muzzle brakes be procured and installed on those 76mm guns which are now not equipped with them.

2. The 2" mortar has paid dividends in many respects. For screening a knocked out tank, other tanks are able to fire the 2" mortar and permit the crews to withdraw, minimizing casualties. This mortar can also be employed by individual tanks which are assaulted by enemy AT fire, as it provides an effective screen while the tank withdraws to a more favorable position.

3. During night operations, while employing tank-infantry teams, the element of surprise is lost due to the noise of the tanks. In the recent assault on Stainwald Woods by Company B of this Battalion, in support of the 66<sup>th</sup> AIB, the enemy laid heavy mortar and artillery fire on the tanks as they approached, and when the Infantry was in the proximity of the tanks, heavy casualties were inflicted against them. When the tanks hit natural articles and obstacles, the Infantry should dismount at night, and move forward from the tanks; for if the enemy has the tanks under observation, he will undoubtedly lay mortar and artillery fire on their positions.

4. In most instances, when tanks cross open ground in line formation, the enemy wait until we are within 600-800 yards and usually eliminate the first wave. If tanks proceed individually or by section over such terrain the enemy must of necessity open fire, and although casualties may occur on individual tank, the enemy's position is disclosed, and the remainder of the tanks can maneuver to overcome their defensive positions.

5. The enemy tanks in defensive operations will not be in firing positions until our tanks come within effective range. They then pull into well concealed positions and open fire on our elements; frequently and maneuvering to another alternate previously chosen position.

6. In only one instance did our tanks observe enemy machine gun fire being directed at crews who had dismounted from knocked out tanks. Enemy AT gunners will throw high explosive shells in the area once they have knocked out a vehicle.

7. In any tank that is hit and stopped the crew should bail out immediately, as the enemy can be depended upon to fire at least one more shell into your tank; usually more. One of our company commanders had three tanks knocked out from under him, and each of the three was hit at least

twice. If possible dismount on the side of the tank away from the enemy fire, as this gives protection against additional enemy fire.

8. Three enemy tanks were knocked out at ranges between 1700 and 1900 yards. A Tiger tank was knocked out at 2100 yards by a glancing 75mm AP which entered the underside of the tank.

9. Enemy anti-tank guns usually work in pairs and are situated so as to bring cross fire on targets at very close range.

10. When the enemy really wants an objective, he will use smaller tanks as bait to suck you in and make you expend your ammunition, and then he will hit you with everything he has.

11. During artillery barrages, the tanks afford better protection than foxholes. Further, the crew is ready for any circumstances which might arise.

12. When fighting tanks and AT guns, keep changing positions constantly, for it seems to throw the German gunners off because they seem unable to make shifts readily.

13. The vision slits in the new tank equipped with the 76mm gun give the tank commander a huge advantage when close-in fighting is encountered.

14. When searching terrain at long ranges, the M-13 binoculars may be used by looking through them and the M-70F sight. This gives the gunner increased visibility.

15. Difficulties have been encountered by sights and binoculars becoming coated with frost and mist, inside and out. Some form of anti-dim employing anti-freeze base, would be most advantageous to surmount this difficulty.

16. The present M-13 binoculars are not too effective at long ranges. It is recommended that each tank commander be equipped with a more powerful pair.

17. When preparing dug-in mortar positions, the ammo men should be dug in out of effective shell-burst radius, minimizing casualties.

18. By employing the 3 riflemen in the mortar platoon as a field communications team, wire can be laid and radio employed. Field telephones should be a part of the Mortar Platoon TO, augmenting, not replacing radio communication.

19. Members of the Assault Gun Platoon should be provided magnifying glasses to pick up small terrain features on the 1/25000 map. The Assault Gun Platoon can then better aid forward elements who report enemy positions near such features.

/signed/

WILLIAM A EDWARDS

Major, Infantry, Commanding

## PRELUDE TO NARRATIVE

On 1 January 1945 the Battalion, less Companies A and B, and with Company C, 17<sup>th</sup> Armored Infantry Battalion attached, was located at Lohr, France (Q368328). Orders had been received from Combat Command Reserve, 12<sup>th</sup> Armored Division, alerting this Unit for movement to new location, vicinity Arracourt, France (Q115745). The entire Division was a part of XV Corps, 7<sup>th</sup> U.S. Army. Company A was attached to the 100<sup>th</sup> Infantry Division and was fighting in the vicinity of Rimling, France. Company B was attached to the 17<sup>th</sup> Infantry Battalion, billeted at Insviller, France. Combat Command R was located at Munster, France (Q392353).

## 1 January 1945

At 0315 orders were received from CC-R stating that billeting parties would report to their Headquarters at 010830A. Billeting parties reported as ordered and proceeded to location at Arracourt, France, where they made arrangements for billeting the Battalion in towns surrounding.

At 1000 an overlay was received prescribing the route and new location. However, this was later changed at 1210, when orders were received postponing movement and placing the Battalion on a three (3) hour alert.

Billeting parties remained at Arracourt in the event movement would be executed, and were returned the following morning when no orders were received.

Since the movement was never executed there is no enclosure other than the Journal showing route. However, all Companies received the movement order, but naturally never carried them out.

## 2 January 1945

The morning was spent in preparation for a practice problem to be carried out between Lohr and Munster on the following day. The CO, Major Edwards and S-3, Captain Comfort worked on the problem together during the morning, and made frequent trips to Munster to receive elaboration on some of the plans.

At 1400, the CO inspected mortar firing which C Company, 17<sup>th</sup> (attached) was carrying out in area NE of Lohr.

At 1415, orders were received from CC-R stating the problem scheduled for the following day would be executed.

At 1615, the Company Commanders were called to the CP where the problem was explained and orders were issued by S-3 as follows:

1. a.
- b.
2. a. This Battalion attacks at 031000A from present position to seize Munster.

Order of Attack: C/17, C/23, AG Plat, Mortar Plat, D/23.

- b. Line of Departure: Overlay, S-2 and S-3 Journal
- c. Axis of attack: 52 degrees MA (Guide on Church Steeple at Munster).
- d. Boundaries: Overlay (Inclosure 1).

- e. (1) Rallying Point: Objective.
  - (2) Alternate Rallying Point: Present Position.
- 3. a. D/23 protect left flank and maintain contact w/36 Infantry Division on left and 17<sup>th</sup> Armored Infantry Battalion on right.
  - b. C/23, Assault Gun and Mortar Platoons support C/17 and displace fwd on order.
  - c. Reconnaissance Platoon (assumed) will maintain contact with 17 Armored Infantry Battalion.
  - d. 495 AFA Battalion (assumed) will fire observed preparatory fires on enemy positions as follows from H-6 and H-1:
    - (1) Machine Guns – 361333 and 368334
    - (2) AT Guns – 373336
    - (3) Dug in Position – 369336 and 374338.
- 4. a. Axis of Maintenance and Evacuation: Axis of attack.
  - b. Axis of Personnel Evacuation: Axis of attack to Battalion Aid Station.
- 5. a. Current SOI governs; Battalion Command Net opens 030800A.
  - b. Commanding Officer with Command Tank.

It is now

Any questions?

At 1600, CC-R advised that there would be a critique of the problem at 1900 the following night at Insviller.

At 1908, official problem was received from CC-R and sent out to the Companies.

No other unusual occurrences for the remainder of this date.

### 3 January 1945.

The problem scheduled for this date got underway at 1000 and ended at 1225. The problem was a success in its entirety, stressing mostly tank-infantry cooperation and proper use of Assault Guns, Artillery, and AT weapons and communications.

The remainder of the afternoon was spent policing up tanks and maintaining other vehicles and weapons.

At 1900, a critique of the problem was held at 17<sup>th</sup> AIB Headquarters at Insviller, France. Attendance at this critique: all officers, staff and company.

No other unusual occurrences for this date.

#### 4 January 1945.

C Company, 17<sup>th</sup> AIB again practiced mortar firing this date in area NE of Lohr. The CO and S-3 went out to observe this firing at 1400, returned to Headquarters at 1600.

CC-R advised us during the afternoon that an identical problem as that held on 3 January would be held the following day. The CO and S-3 made all necessary arrangements for proper pursuit of the problem. Overlays and written orders substantially the same as those issued the day previous were gotten out at 2130.

No other unusual occurrences for this date.

#### 5 January 1945.

The problem was started at 1000 and ended at 1208. Many of the difficulties encountered in the previous problem were corrected, such as improper communication and use of coordinate code.

At 1430, the CO attended a meeting at CC-R where the problem was discussed by the higher commanders and a critique was held.

At 1830, the CO called a meeting of all officers and held a critique at Battalion Headquarters.

#### 6 January 1945.

At approximately 0730 this date, Private Cappello, Headquarters Company, was shot and later died from a bullet which came through the floor from the room upstairs. Private D. T. Walker, Headquarters Company, had just come off guard and was clearing his weapon, a German Luger pistol, when it discharged through the floor. An investigation of the accident was made and it was determined that the accident was incurred Line of Duty for Private Cappello. Private Walker was not convicted of any crime at that time.

At 1205 this date a message was gotten out to all companies that any enemy weapons in the hands of troops would be turned over to the S-4 for safekeeping without delay. This was complied with prior to 1800 this date.

No other unusual occurrences for this date.

7 January 1945.

At 1230 this date the CO went to CC-R at Munster to check for possible movement orders and was advised that movement was pending. Informed all concerned upon his return.

At 1330 word was received that billeting parties were to report to CC-R Headquarters at once. They departed at 1350.

At 1430 the CO went to CC-R to check for movement orders and was told that we were to be prepared to move out in 20 minutes. He returned and immediately alerted all companies to the situation. Verbal orders were issued on the spot, indicating order of march as follows: Hq Co, Co C, Co D, Sv Co, Co C/17, Med Det, Maint. Company A was to be relieved from the 100<sup>th</sup> Division and join us at Phalsbourg. No route of march had as yet been prescribed. Speed was to be 12 MPH. This later proved difficult due to icy roads.

At 1605 the column moved out from Lohr through Insviller (IP). Difficulty was encountered crossing the bridge at Insviller, and all Companies following C/23 had to change their route of march and go through Munster.

Route of march was learned to be: Insviller, Penetrance, Kirrberg, Rauwiller, Lixheim, Phalsbourg, Saverne, Dettwiller, Hochfelden, Ohlungen.

At 2330 the head of column arrived at new CP at Ohlungen, France (Q975236). Total distance traveled: 48.1 miles. For route of march, see S-2, S-3 Journal.

C Company, this Battalion and C Company, 17<sup>th</sup> Armored Infantry Battalion were located at Uhlwiller, France, about 3 km to the NW of Ohlungen. All the Division was under VI Corps, 7 US Army upon departure from Ohlungen.

8 January 1945.

Entire Battalion, less A Company, closed in to bivouac area at 0130 this date. Company A closed at 0330. No personnel or vehicular casualties.

At 0745 the Reconnaissance Platoon was sent out to reconnoiter route to the north and east. Returned at 1500. Results forwarded to CC-R.

At 1830 this date a company commanders' meeting was called and plans of reconnaissance were explained. The Battalion was to be prepared to counter any thrust the enemy might make from the northwest, north, or northeast. Plans were discussed and the meeting terminated.

Captain William R. Comfort received orders announcing his promotion to rank of Major.

No other unusual occurrences for this date.

9 January 1945.

At 0107 C Company tank dozer was ordered sent to CC-B at Bischwiller. This dozer was departed at 0315 from Uhlwiller and struck several American mines just outside town. Attributed to snow covering mines. No personnel casualties.

At 1045 an overlay showing location of mines was forwarded to higher headquarters; CO and S-3 checked location personally.

The tank dozer was immediately put under repair and departed for Bischwiller at 2125, arriving safely.

At 1700 another route reconnaissance plan was forwarded from CC-R, and reconnaissance platoon leader was immediately advised. In addition, all company commanders were to make a personal reconnaissance of routes. See S-2 and S-3 Journals.

No other unusual occurrences for this date.

10 January 1945.

At 0915 this Battalion was placed on 2 hour alert. Destination unknown.

At 1230 the Reconnaissance Platoon Leader cleared mines in Uhlwiller.

No other unusual occurrences for this date.

11 January 1945.

At 0930, CO and S-3 went out to reconnoiter plans for attack to the NE. See S-2 and S-3 Journals.

At 1900 an Officers School was held at Battalion CP covering methods of communication and later an orientation talk was given on VI Corps front. Also discussed at this school was the problem of men getting schnapps and other alcoholic beverages and methods of prevention. It was decided that the Mayor would be advised that townspeople would refrain from either giving or selling intoxicants to any member of our command.

No other unusual occurrences for this date.

12 January 1945.

At 0830 word was received from higher headquarters that instruction in flame thrower would be held in Bernolsheim Q967174 at 1300 this date. S-3 immediately contacted companies and arranged for detail of men to attend this school. One man from each medium tank company attended, as it was anticipated that each company would eventually be issued one flame thrower.

At 1400 a meeting of all company commanders was called and arrangements were made for canvas of the towns of Ohlungen and Uhlwiller for weapons and deserters.

At 1430 all companies made a thorough search of all homes in these villages. Twenty-four deserters from the German Army were apprehended from both towns and forwarded to CIC for questioning. This was accomplished as a result of conversation with Div G-2 and officer from the CIC. Most of the deserters were later returned but all had been submitted to screening.

In addition, 6 American carbines and several types of German weapons were uncovered and turned over to S-4 to be turned into Ordnance.

No other unusual occurrences for this date.

#### 13 January 1945.

At 1135 a search was made of the home of Joseph Fuch, #54, Ohlungen. He had been reported by the Mayor and other townspeople as having a radio in his home with which he communicated with the enemy when the Americans first entered the village of Ohlungen. No results were obtained. Several radio parts were discovered, but no complete evidence was uncovered.

At 1440 we were advised that our Battalion was released from CC-R and attached to 12<sup>th</sup> Armored Division Artillery. This was later rescinded and only Companies A, C, and Assault Gun Platoon and 1 Platoon from D Company would be attached. The remainder of the Battalion was to remain under CC-R control. In Addition, Company C, 17<sup>th</sup> Armored Infantry Battalion was released from attachment to our Battalion and returned to their parent organization. Company C/17 was notified of this release at 1445 and the CO, 17, C Company immediately reported to CO, 17<sup>th</sup> at Schweighausen.

At 1500 CO reported to CO Division Artillery Command at Bischwiller.

At 1830 a meeting of all company commanders was called, and it was disclosed that companies A and C and AG Platoon would move to indirect firing positions in the vicinity of Gries; the remainder of the Battalion would remain in their present location at Ohlungen. No movement time was announced.

No other unusual occurrences for this date.

#### 14 January 1945.

At approximately 0745 this date S/Sgt Kramer, Company D, this Battalion, killed himself by accident when his submachine gun M-3 discharged and sent a bullet through his head. Board of Officers was reported to investigate facts and circumstances. Report was rendered to Headquarters, CC-R immediately after official notification was received from the Medical Detachment.

At 0930 orders were received that all cerise panels would be removed from all vehicles.

At 1230 Companies A and C and AG Platoon departed for Division Artillery with all vehicles less kitchens and maintenance.

One platoon and D Company was attached to Division Artillery and assigned mission of protecting 240mm artillery battalion located at Schirroheim, east of Bischwiller.

No other unusual activities for this date.

#### 15 January 1945.

At 0930 CO went to Bischwiller to check on firing positions our A and C Companies had set up outside Greis. 493<sup>rd</sup> (to which our companies were attached) was located at Bischwiller. Our Assault Gun Platoon was in position to the west of Bischwiller. Missions fired were correspondent with 493<sup>rd</sup>.

No other unusual activities for this date.

#### 16 January 1945.

At 0001 1 Platoon from Company D was alerted for movement to Gries (R0617).

At 0001 this Battalion (-detachments) was alerted for movement any time after 0800. All companies were immediately notified.

At 0050 confirmation was received from CC-R relative sending one tank platoon from D Company to Gries, to depart Ohlungen at 0700.

At 0730 3<sup>rd</sup> Platoon, Company D departed for Gries to protect flank of our firing positions. CO informed by radio that they were on the way.

At 1800 this Battalion was detached from CC-R and attached to CC-A, Headquarters located at Weyersheim, France (R0413).

At 1800 Companies A, C, and Assault Gun Platoon was returned to this unit from 493<sup>rd</sup> Armored Field Artillery Battalion and also began an integral part of CC-A.

At 2340, Company B, which had previously been attached to 17<sup>th</sup> Armored Infantry Battalion, was attached to the 66<sup>th</sup> Armored Infantry Battalion.

At 2340, Battalion received orders to move to attack position vicinity E Weyersheim, France so as to jump off at 0700.

At 2400 Operation Directive Number 10 was received by this Headquarters. It read substantially as follows:

1. CC-A attacks to seize Offendorf and Herrlisheim, 17 January 1945 (times as indicated in paragraph 3 below).

2. Troops:

<u>TF #1</u>	<u>TF #2</u>	<u>TF #3</u>	<u>TF #4</u>	<u>CC-A Troops</u>
43 Tk	66 AIB	17 AIB (-)	23 Tk (-)	Hq & Hq/CC-A
1/c/119	A/119		C/119 (-)	C/572 (-)
1/B/92	B/23 (-)			1/B/23
				1/sq/A/119
				A/134

3. a. 43 Tk attached 1/c/119. Follow 17 AIB to attack position 17 January. Take up positions east Herrlisheim. Atk 0700 to seize that place. Artillery on call. Coordinate with 17 AIB.

b. 66 AIB. Atchd A/119, BN-23 (I/2-). Atk 0200 to seize Stainwald wood. Upon passing through wood 2/232 will take over from 66 AIB and mop up. 66 AIB continue atk to Offendorf. LD., Canal.

Artillery preparation starting 0200:

0200-0230: Light preparation on west 1/3 of woods.

0230-0240: Heavy preparation on west 1/3 of woods.

0240-0310: Light preparation on center of woods.

0310-0330: Two (2) volleys HE, then 20 minutes of WP on east end of woods.

c. 17 AIB. Move to atk position 17 Jan south Herrlisheim, atk to seize Herrlisheim 0700 in conjunction with atk 43 Tk from east. Coordinate with 43 Tk. Arty on call. Combat patrol clear AT guns from woods east Herrlisheim.

d. 23 Tk. Atchd C/119 (-). B/23 attached 66 AIB at once. 23 Tk (-) move from present position via Weyersheim, two Treadway bridges to atk position NW Check Pt 3. Atk 0700 to seize Offendorf. LD: Line between check points 3 and 6. Artillery on call.

No other unusual occurrences for this date.

Attack Overlay: Inclosure 2, page \_\_\_\_.

17 January 1945.

Major Edwards, the Battalion Commander, was at Gries when word was received just after midnight for him to report to CC-A Headquarters at Weyersheim.

Major Edwards immediately reported and received orders as shown in S-2 and S-3 Journal. At that time plans for the attack were given, including that of the 17<sup>th</sup> and 43<sup>rd</sup> on our left and the 66<sup>th</sup> plus B/23 on our right.

After discussing the plans, Major Edwards returned to the tank companies at Gries and immediately sent word back to the rear CP at Ohlungen ordering them forward into Weyersheim. He then gave the march order for movement into the assembly area east of Weyersheim, as follows:

“Refer to your maps.”

“This Battalion, under CC-A, attacks at 0700. Plans and orders for the attack will be issued in the assembly area.

The Battalion will move to assembly area in following order: A, C, D.

Cross IP (road intersection Gries) at 0300.

Route: Direct to Weyersheim, then through to the east to assembly area.

Ren platoon will act as guides.

Pick up A/119 to guide remainder of way out of Weyersheim.

Artillery observers and C/119 will join column at Weyersheim.

One FO tank with A Company, one with C Company, liaison with me.

Interval 25-30 yards.

I will follow lead vehicle.

Fuel & Lube and Ammo will be brought to your locations here before departure.

Aid Station set up and remain at Weyersheim.”

After the Battalion had moved through Weyersheim and into assembly position, the Company Commanders were again assembled and attack order was issued as follows:

“Enemy information is on my map. The enemy is reported in the Stainwald Woods, and an AT gun was reported at this RR crossing yesterday.

Friendly 17 AIB plus 43 Tk move N from this assembly position to take Herrlisheim at 0700.

Friendly 66<sup>th</sup> AIB plus B/23 move E to attack Stainwald Woods at 0200.

This Battalion attacks at 0700 due East to upper half of Offendorf and capture bridges A & C.

Attack column of Companies: Company A in lead, C Company follow and cover A.

This is a wider flat area, disperse tanks, advance by watching over each other.

Assault Gun Platoon support from present position (West Bischwiller).

Mortar Platoon has been sent for at Ohlungen. They are to displace forward as we progress in movements.

Reconnaissance by fire on any suspicious localities.

AG and 493 FA fire on targets on call.

Engineers will ride on tanks of Company C and will move in to the town of Offendorf with tanks on which they ride. They will ride up until we encounter fire, and will act as Infantry on attack of town.

Demolition Engineer equipment will be left at assembly area on call.

Medical Detachment set up in the vicinity of CC-A.

Prisoners of War will be moved back to the light tank position where Company D will take care of them.

D in reserve available for use as flank protection.

One light tank per company for evacuation of wounded.

I will follow “A”.

Radios Operative.

Maintain contact with units on right and left flanks.”

17 January 1945.

At approximately 0300, the forward elements of Battalion, consisting of CO, S-3, and Companies A and C, moved out from firing positions in Gries to assembly area vicinity E Weyersheim, preparatory to jumping off in the attack as scheduled for 0700.

Attack Order – Inclosure #1.

At 0315, the rear CP (Ohlungen), moved out for new location at Weyersheim. At that time the Mortar Platoon and Company D (-) moved forward with the rear CP to Weyersheim preparatory to going forward to assist in the attack. All had arrived there by 0710.

The Assault Gun Platoon had taken up firing positions at the western edge of Bischwiller and was available for immediate fire-missions in our attack zone.

At 0721, the Executive Officer, Major Jerome W Schrader, communicated with the CO and advised him of the availability of both Company D and the Mortar Platoon. The CO advised he would send guides back to lead the Mortar Platoon forward, but for Company D to remain in their location on the eastern edge of Weyersheim. Guides were sent to the rear for the Mortar Platoon, but they were unable to proceed as fully forward as planned due to enemy artillery falling on the treadway bridge across which our Assault Companies were crossing. This artillery, unknown caliber, was coming from the east, and continued until all our companies had gotten across the treadway. No casualties were suffered during this crossing. However, this action plus the slippery surfaces and poor approaches to and from the treadway, considerably slowed our crossing, and all companies were not in attack positions until approximately 0830.

At 0839 our CO requested information from CC-A as to whether or not to proceed with orders.

At 0843 our CO again requested information as to whether or not to proceed on mission. CC-A then requested his location, and the reply was that forward elements were between check points 3 and 6.

At 0853, CC-A advised "Proceed to objective and report location of leading elements."

At 0853 our CO requested information of unit on our right flank which was supposed to have taken Stainwald Woods earlier that morning, and the reply was that it had not been accomplished and area questioned was not under our control.

At 0900, CO gave Assault Guns mission of firing platoon 3 rounds in area between check points 3 and 7 to cover our right flank, and at 0926 our leading elements (Company A, Company C) crossed the Line of Departure.

At 0938, CC-A sent a radio message to our CO to "get going."

At 1010, CO reported advance elements held up N of check point 7, having same difficulty as other unit. (This refers to day previous when the 43<sup>rd</sup> Tank Battalion had attempted the same maneuver and lost 12 tanks to enemy AT fire from vicinity of check point 7.)

At 1014 CO received the following message from CG, CC-A: "Situation is breaking up. Drive vigorously toward objective."

At 1034 our CO radioed back: "6 of our tanks knocked out, trying to pass around to the left."

At 1045, our objective was changed, and new mission was to proceed to the east of Herrlisheim and then to northeast of Drusenheim. Upon receipt of orders from CC-A to attack via E Herrlisheim, 4000 yards northeast to Drusenheim, the Battalion Commander assembled the company commanders to give them the attack order. When the order was started by Major Edwards, the S-3 (Major Comfort) and Company Commanders immediately objected, saying they would all be killed before they reached Herrlisheim. The Battalion CO stated: "There's a reason for it, and we don't know the big picture. I will move my tank on to Herrlisheim. If I make it, you follow." After considering, the CO called back for a platoon to cover his movement. Upon reaching the town he called back for the other tanks, which then moved in. The first platoon of tanks to arrive was set in positions to cover the approach of remaining tanks. It was these tanks which later encountered enemy tanks in the town. AT guns were spotted vicinity of Offendorf and permission was granted to fire on these before proceeding towards objective at this time. The advance elements moved to 200 yards south of check point 12 (Herrlisheim) and at 1302 reported two enemy tanks moving toward them from vicinity Offendorf. These tanks were engaged and at 13445 a message was received that one of the tanks had been knocked out and the other had gotten away.

At 1345, our tanks engaged a group of enemy in Herrlisheim who had trapped elements of the 17<sup>th</sup> Inf Bn who were in the south portion of the town, and succeeded in dispersing the enemy force. At 1359, friendly reconnaissance planes reported enemy moving out in counterattack from Offendorf towards Herrlisheim. Positions to repel this attack were taken, but friendly artillery fire succeeded in postponing this movement. Again at 1420, a counterattack was launched, and again artillery dispersed the enemy.

At 1500, our CO was advised that "Higher Headquarters directs that Battalion move out for objective at once."

Upon receipt of these orders the Battalion Commander again met the same reluctance from the S-3 and Company Commanders. At approximately this time the positions our tanks occupied in town were under heavy artillery fire. At 1507 the S-3 replied that we were unable to move out due to heavy resistance. At 1553, the S-3 again reported it impossible to proceed on attack because of heavy opposition. At 1558, orders were received to remain in position until advised further.

At 1600, 5 enemy tanks came out of vicinity Drusenheim, and one was knocked out. The remainder escaped in the direction from which they had come. At 1607, orders were received to "Attack for 2<sup>nd</sup> objective (Drusenheim) and to move out at once." However, this movement was still not possible, due to heavy opposition from front and right flank, and when a message was received that CC-B was moving out in their attack from Drusenheim towards Herrlisheim, our forward elements were still under fire at check point 12 (Herrlisheim).

At 1806, our CO was asked to see if he could contact the 43<sup>rd</sup>, which had been out of contact for some time. Every effort was expended to make this contact, to no avail.

Just before dark, at approximately 1730, 1<sup>st</sup> Lt Ernest H Garneau, Company Commander, Company C, was wounded and 2d Lt Edward S Reitane, one of the Platoon Leaders, was killed due to enemy artillery fire falling on our positions in the south of town.

Companies A and C then moved to the south and west just outside of Herrlisheim and took up defensive positions for the night.

At 1843, the situation was quiet; however, enemy motors could be heard going up and down the road from Offendorf to Herrlisheim.

At 2000, the attack order for the following day was received from CC-A and was given to S-4, Captain Hann, to take forward to the CO's position. The order indicated our objective was still Drusenheim. We were to push off at 0400 the following morning, on the same route of attack. The 17<sup>th</sup> was to complete occupation of Herrlisheim and the 66<sup>th</sup> plus B/23 was to continue the attack towards Offendorf.

At approximately 0300, the following morning, when movement order was received by Major Edwards, the S-3 and one of the Company Commanders again objected to attacking. They wanted to delay until Lt Col Well, 66<sup>th</sup> AIB, returned from CC-A, where he had gone to advise them of the situation.

For the remainder of the night of 17 January 1945, the situation was relatively quiet, with occasional spasmodic enemy artillery fire coming in on our defensive positions from the east.

During this entire day, telephone communications existed between the rear CP and Headquarters CC-A at Weyersheim, and most of the necessary reports of enemy activities and orders back and forth were communicated through this medium. It proved to be very practical and expeditious.

#### 18 January 1945.

At 0130, confirmation of previous orders was received, indicating the plans for attack this morning. The order read as follows:

1. CC-A atks 17-18 Jan 45 to seize DRUSENHEIM, HERRLISHEIM and OFFENDORF.

2. TROOPS:

<u>F-1</u>	<u>F-2</u>	<u>F-3</u>	<u>F-4</u>	<u>CC Trs</u>
43 Tk (-)	66 AIB	17 (-)	23 Tk (-)	Hq & Hq CC-A
1/C/119	B/23	C/119 (-)		C/572
	A/119 (-)	D/43 (-)		A/134
				2 Plat A/119

3. F-2 (Wells) and F-3 (Logan) continue atk to seize HERRLISHEIM at 180730A.

4. F-3 and F-4 atk from present position vic HERRLISHEIM at 0400 to seize DRUSENHEIM.

5. 17 and 66 establish and maintain liaison.

This order had previously been given verbally and forwarded to Major Edwards by Major Schrader; thus our forward elements had already been advised of the attack plans.

At 0428, CO advised our troops were receiving artillery fire.

At 0430, CC-A ordered our CO to move out in attack immediately.

At 0450, CC-A requested information concerning whether our forward elements had moved out.

At 0545, CC-A ordered elements held up where they were.

At 0710, CC-A ordered as follows: "Get ready to take off either as planned or North into 12."

At 0835, the above order was rescinded and our forward elements were ordered to protect 66<sup>th</sup> Inf right flank and rear, and to be prepared to attack to the NW to seize check point 12. Positions were immediately taken to perform this order.

At 0857 our CO reported an AT gun firing from vicinity check point 7, 150 yards from edge of woods. At 0900 the Assault Gun Platoon laid a fire mission on that point. Fire was adjusted by Major Edwards.

At 0903, friendly reconnaissance planes reported 3 AT guns located at 115112. This information was immediately forwarded to CO. Artillery fire was already "on the way."

At 0930, CC-A reported undetermined number of infantry moving NW from coordinates 124135. This was also immediately forwarded to CO.

At 1040, S-3 requested guides to meet him at east end of Weyersheim to guide him back to get ammo truck. S-32 returned to rear CP and picked up ammo truck. While there the CG, CC-A sent word he wanted to see our S-3, so Major Comfort went to CC-A Headquarters and acquainted them with our situation.

At 1252, 4 rounds of enemy artillery, caliber 105, fell on our forward elements, presumably coming from Stainwald Woods.

At 1430, CC-A requested information on 43<sup>rd</sup> Tank Battalion and asked our CO if they were with him. The reply was negative.

At 1515, orders were received to move rear CP to new location vicinity Gries. At 1530, the rear CP moved out and closed into Gries at 1547.

Meanwhile, our forward elements had been released and called back from front, under the following orders:

1. CC-A will occupy and defend assigned area (See S-2, S-3 Journal).

2. OPL, sectors of responsibility, visiting patrol, adjacent units, Incl 3.

3. 66 AIB -----

119 Eng-----

17 AIB -----

43 Tk-----

23 Tk-----

23 Tk (-1 Med Tk Co) in CC mobile reserve in assembly area vicinity Gries, prepared to counter-attack enemy penetration and restore defense line. One Medium tank company occupy firing position S edge of woods 080155 and prepare fires in coordination with 494 AFA Bn.

(1) Bn Assault Guns and Mortar Platoons attached to 493.

(2) Rallying Point – Weyersheim.

(3) Special precautions will be taken to assure that personnel are alert for a pre-dawn attack.

Company C was designated to take up positions indicated in Incl #3, and the remainder of the Battalion (-AG and Mort) moved to Gries, closing in there at 1717.

Company C took positions at 1724, and was immediately alerted for counterattack, but this did not materialize.

Security outposts were established around Gries for the night (see S-2, S-3 Journal) and men were fed a hot meal and retired for the night.

At 2200, official confirmation of defense order was received,

No other unusual activities for this period.

19 January 1945.

#### COMPANY C ACTIVITIES IN THE LINE

At 0545 the Battalion was alerted for attack from the North and East.

At 0601, it was disclosed that a counterattack was developing towards our C Company, under 1<sup>st</sup> Lt Wayne F Guitteau. C Company was in woods coord 0815. Captain, name unknown, from 119<sup>th</sup> Engr Bn, came back to Company C position with 15 men and reported the enemy had broken through their line of resistance.

Lt Col Harry Lardin, Ex O, CC-A, came to Lt Guitteau and ordered his company to move to coordinates 0778123 and establish defensive positions overlooking road leading into Gambsheim. At this time it was just getting light, about 0630.

C Company immediately moved to the South and in the vicinity of coordinates indicated Lt Guitteau gained contact with approximately 4 tanks of the 43<sup>rd</sup> Tank Battalion under command of Major Hall. He gave Lt Guitteau the situation and warned him of presence of AT gun which had

knocked out one of his tanks at 086121. The position of the AT gun was indefinite. Warning was also made that area directly SE of Stainwald Woods (N of Gambsheim) was a place where suspected AT guns or tanks might be.

At this time Major Hall moved his tanks towards Weyersheim and Lt Guitteau took over his position. Lt Guitteau ordered S/Sgt Ayes (Acting Platoon Leader, 2d Platoon) to move his tanks to the next tree line which bordered the canal to his front. Cover was very scarce and in order to observe check point 2 as ordered, these tanks of a necessity had to be placed in the open. Lt Guitteau remained with CP tank along with the 1<sup>st</sup> and 3<sup>rd</sup> Platoons. At this time Col Lardin called on the radio and ordered Lt Guitteau to send one platoon to wipe out reported enemy in woods at 092145. Lt Guitteau ordered Lt Sadler's 3<sup>rd</sup> Platoon to proceed on this mission. All tanks of the company at that time were under heavy AT and artillery fire, coming from direction of Gambsheim. Sgt Scorpio's tank of the 3<sup>rd</sup> Platoon was hit by 75mm AT gun, at 078123. The light tank used for medical evacuation was radioed and arrived at the knocked out tank in two minutes. Sgt Scorpio was wounded along with his leader, Pvt Stacey. Pvt Stacey was trapped in his tank but through the efforts of two of his crew members, he was evacuated under enemy fire.

Lt Sadler continued on his mission while the remaining tanks in the company laid down a heavy concentration of HE fire on the suspected area where enemy fire was originating.

At this time Sgt Moon's (2d Platoon) tank was hit by artillery; the crew evacuated and crawled to the CP tank. Enemy fire ceased at this time, and the next hour was comparatively quiet. This was approximately 1040. During this time Sgt Moon volunteered to go out to the two tanks which had been knocked out and attempt to drive them back if they would move. He succeeded in doing this, and his crew manned the two knocked out tanks and drove them to the rear as ordered.

S/Sgt Ayres (2d Platoon) moved his tank to edge of canal 086122 in full view of the enemy and maintained for three hours continual observation of road leading into Gambsheim. During this time he succeeded in knocking out four (4) enemy tanks and causing two more to withdraw back into Gambsheim. At approximately 1430, Sgt Ayres radioed Lt Guitteau and stated increased activity was noted in vicinity of knocked out enemy tanks. Lt Guitteau immediately ordered Sgt Bridge (1<sup>st</sup> Platoon) to follow him and take position beside the 2d Platoon. Enemy tanks were observed moving in the vicinity 102105. The added punch provided by the 76mm guns caused three more enemy tanks to be knocked out, all of which were set afire. Intense tank fire was received at this time, and Lt Guitteau was receiving continuous report of his tanks needing ammunition. This was immediately reported to Battalion but the Armor Piercing ammunition was practically drawn when Lt Guitteau gave the order to withdraw to tree line previously occupied that morning, 078123. The enemy tanks under C Company observation seemed to be confused and purple smoke was observed in the vicinity of their tanks. These tanks were very easily discerned because they were painted white and there was no snow on the ground at that time.

C Company was successful in their withdrawal with no losses being incurred.

At approximately 1545, 3 C Company tanks were knocked out by an enemy tank which had come forward to a point 081123, unobserved. Only one casualty was inflicted, that being the gunner in Sgt Ayre's tank. He was unable to walk under his own power and was evacuated to

Weyersheim. Sgt Bridge was successful in withdrawing his 1<sup>st</sup> Platoon, which had completely run out of ammunition, back into Weyersheim, where they were finally joined by the Company Commander.

Lt Sadler's Platoon at 092145 had meanwhile, starting at approximately 1100, taken up positions in the woods there, after encountering no enemy. The next two or three hours were spent without action by this platoon, and Lt Sadler, intercepting Lt Guitteau's request to Battalion for more ammunition, requested permission from Col Lardin (who was at his position) to send his platoon to Lt Guitteau's aid. This was refused and shortly later Lt Sadler did manage to get permission to send one section of aid the rest of the Company. This section, under the command of S/Sgt Vickless, took up positions at 088138, when they noticed a German counterattack coming from the direction of Herrlisheim along the canal. This was at approximately 1600. They remained in their positions, and as the enemy tanks advanced SW along the canal towards Weyersheim, this section was able to fire into their flanks, taking a toll of 10 enemy tanks, 8 of which were left burning, before they also ran out of armor piercing ammunition.

Lt Sadler's section, in the meantime, was able to knock out 2 enemy tanks before his tank was knocked out. At this time Col Lardin suggested 2 tanks in the edge of woods in full view of the enemy in order to keep them at a distance, in spite of the fact these tanks had exhausted their ammunition supply. This was not carried out, and Sgt Vickless' tank along with Sgt Dietrich and Sgt Jewell's tank returned to woods at 0815, which they had occupied the night previous. This left four tanks in Weyersheim and 3 in woods 0815, where they were replenishing ammunition and gasoline. The Company Commander, in Weyersheim, received orders to move his four tanks to woods vicinity of Gries (0815) to join with the 3 tanks already there. This was changed, however, and all tanks remained in their respective locations.

There were no further activities for the remaining 7 tanks in Company C this date.

20 January 1945.

#### COMPANY C ACTIVITIES IN THE LINE

Lt Sadler brought his 3 tanks to Weyersheim at approximately 0800 and joined Lt Guitteau there.

The remainder of this date until 2000 was employed cleaning weapons and drying wet clothes in a warm room which was obtained by CO.

At approximately 0300 this date, this company, along with the remainder of the Battalion, was relieved from CC-A, 12<sup>th</sup> Armored Division, and placed under the command of 36<sup>th</sup> Infantry Division, which had taken over our assigned sector.

An enemy counterattack was still suspected in this area, and Lt Guitteau received an order from Battalion CO, Major Edwards, to place one section of his tanks out on the front line being held by the friendly doughs outside Weyersheim at coordinates 062123. This mission was given to S/Sgt Vickless and Sgt Dietrich, and after a reconnaissance was made by Bn CO, Co CO, and Sgt Vickless,

the tanks were brought forward. They took up positions W of canal running NS at coordinates 062123. It was snowing at this time, and the snow laid deep on the ground.

It Guitteau, at 0900, received orders for Lt Sadler to take his remaining tanks and take up position at 055125, acting as reserve in case help would be needed. Sgt Bridge's platoon was alerted for movement on a moment's notice. The CC had radio contact with Sgt Vickless who sent information back as it developed.

At approximately 2000 he reported dismounted enemy attack moving in his direction from the west.

Infantry support to the tanks at this sector was very scant, and as enemy moved within range the machine guns of Sgt Vickless' section opened up. Some enemy were able to come within challenging distance of the tanks and two wounded enemy managed to surrender as PW. Fire received from enemy being directed at tanks was 7.92 cm machine pistol fire. This fierce fire from the two tanks caused the enemy to shift their attack N to the sector manned heavily by friendly doughs.

For the remainder of this date there were no other unusual activities for Company C.

#### 21 January 1945.

Sgt Vickless kept the CP informed of activity from 0001 until 0600, from his position, but activity was limited to slight actions by the enemy. He was able to observe quite a number of apparently knocked out enemy doughs laying to his front. It was later determined that better than 100 enemy had been knocked out by the fire from the two tanks the night previous.

At 0900, Lt Guitteau received orders to withdraw his tanks into Weyersheim. This was accomplished, and the 7 tanks of Company C were once more back together.

At 0830, C Company received orders to proceed to woods 0815, E of Gries, to report to Lt Col Bowden, 143d Inf Regt, 36<sup>th</sup> Inf Div, to support them there. As C Company neared the woods it was apparent that a fire fight was under way, with sniper fire being very prevalent. A guide from the Infantry was furnished to lead the 7 tanks into the woods, and as the CO tank reached the vicinity of the Infantry CP, artillery fire was received on the woods. Lt Guitteau received message on radio that Sgt Vickless has been hit by sniper fire as he was entering woods. Lt Guitteau received message that Sgt Vickless was evacuated, and one hour later Sgt Vickless called Lt Guitteau and requested to be able to return to the company as his wounds were very slight. This request was granted and Sgt Vickless rejoined the company shortly afterwards. Lt Guitteau reported to the CO of the Infantry and the first mission given the tanks was to clean out a pocket of resistance at coordinates 085153. Lt Guitteau ordered Lt Sadler along with Sgt Dietrich on this mission.

They moved their tanks through the woods and Lt Sadler kept complaining that the Infantry platoon assigned to his tanks were not in sight.

The remainder of the tanks from Company C plus some A Company tanks were engaging enemy tank at 089158. Hits were scored on this target but it was not possible to determine whether they were effective due to poor visibility.

The CO dismounted and went on foot reconnaissance of the woods as he had heard a report that enemy tanks were advancing from the south.

Meanwhile, Lt Sadler was carrying out his mission successfully. The enemy was pinned down in a ditch and Lt Sadler, instead of advancing at this point, withdrew his tanks slightly and it was proved later that through this action 102 prisoners were taken. Some, however, attempted to escape and were engaged by both HE and MG fire from the tanks. Lt Sadler, upon completing this mission, reported to the Company Commander (on foot) in woods.

As Lt Guitteau reached the southern-most sector of the woods, he observed 4 friendly TD's attached to the Infantry, but they were not in a firing position, as their guns were pointed into the center of the woods. He observed 5 enemy tanks to the south at 600 yards heading towards Weyersheim. He asked one of the TD sergeants why they were not engaging the tanks, and he replied that his Platoon Leader ordered him not to fire while he went to get help from the tankers. Lt Guitteau immediately ran back to his tanks and ordered Sgt Bridge to follow his vehicle as they moved through the woods into firing positions.

By this time one TD was firing on enemy tanks but only one enemy tank was under observation then. The TD managed to knock this tank out.

Sgt Bridge spotted enemy tanks in vicinity 088137 and immediately opened fire, knocking out 3 enemy tanks by setting them on fire in a period of 5 minutes.

At this time an order was received from Battalion to attack to the South. This was at approximately 1515.

The order wasn't clear, so Lt Guitteau returned to the Infantry CP in the woods and contacted Lt Col Bowden. He clarified the order by stating that C Company tanks would move to the SW to make a junction with the rest of the 23<sup>rd</sup> Tanks coming up from the town of Weyersheim. That order meant that Lt Guitteau would not cross the canal which bordered the woods he was occupying, and the only problem seemed to be the rough terrain.

C Company Tanks were given ammunition by Service Company, orders were issued and the company moved out. Small streams were encountered and these proved difficult to cross. The tanks were stopped completely by a large ditch running E and W and Major Edwards ordered him to remain in that position and await further orders. It was becoming dusk at this time and Lt Walston with 2 tanks from Company A, which had been left behind in the woods to cover Company C's advance, reported enemy doughs advancing across terrain vicinity 088148. These doughs were immediately engaged by heavy cross-fire from the two tank positions. Observations were extremely difficult at this time and effect obtained was not observed.

Orders were then received to return to Weyersheim and join the rest of the Battalion there.

This was accomplished with difficulty in surmounting ditches, and 3 tanks were stuck enroute back. However, the entire company closed into Weyersheim at 1900.

No other unusual occurrences for this period.

17 January 1945.

#### COMPANY A IN THE LINE

At approximately 0800, the Battalion Commander, Major Edwards, issued the attack order to this company, and the Company Commander, Captain Albert C Lange, Jr., issued the order to us as follows:

This company is to attack generally E towards Offendorf, with the Stainwald Woods on our right. Order of attack, 3<sup>rd</sup> Platoon, 1<sup>st</sup> Platoon, 2d Platoon, when you reach the railroad track at coordinate 121128, advise me of your progress.

Platoons moved out in column of sections, with the 3<sup>rd</sup> Platoon in the assault under 2d Lt Costlow, 1<sup>st</sup> Platoon following under 2d Lt Walston, 2d Platoon under S/Sgt Miller. The CO and Artillery FO were positioned between the 3<sup>rd</sup> and 1<sup>st</sup> Platoons. Difficulty was encountered at irrigation ditch running generally N-S at coordinates 1013, resulting in the 3<sup>rd</sup> and 1<sup>st</sup> Platoons and S/Sgt Miller of 2d Platoon arriving at coordinate 115125 ahead of the 2d Platoon, and Lt Walston's tank, which was hung up in ditch. While proceeding Lt Costlow radioed back to Captain Lange and reported tanks in general vicinity 115125, and Captain Lange advised tanks mentioned were the 43<sup>rd</sup> Tank Battalion tanks which had been knocked out the previous day. When the leading platoon arrived highway 1 (out of Gamsheim), he looked to his right rear and discovered Sgt Chroma's tank had been hit and was on fire. Succeeding hits were scored by the enemy on 8 other tanks, including the company commander's tank. The fire appeared to be coming from three directions as follows: south of Herrlisheim, west of Offendorf, and at the northeast corner of Stainwald Woods.

This left 5 tanks in A Company, and Lt Walston in command. He was still having difficulty getting his tank out of the ditch, and by the time he got it clear, the men who had their tanks knocked out were approximately at his position. They were sent to the rear.

Lt Walston reported to the S-3 at coordinates 099131, and attack order was changed as follows:

C Company will take over the assault, and the remaining tanks from A Company will be in support. Route of attack: right bank of Zorn Canal in direction of Herrlisheim. Mission and other orders: no change.

The 5 tanks from A Company under Lt Walston followed C Company along the prescribed route, and when they arrived at a point 200 yards south of check point 12, they observed a light enemy tank pulling out SE from Herrlisheim. One A Company tank aided by one C Company tank opened fire and knocked it out. This was at approximately 1300.

At 1330, two enemy tanks were sighted south of Herrlisheim and Sgt Patterson of A Company took them under fire, knocking one out, setting it on fire, using 76mm AP. It was later revealed that the tank knocked out in this action was a Mark V.

At approximately 1400, Sgt Mattinen sighted another enemy tank SW of Herrlisheim which was firing on Company B, which was located at check point 3. He took it under fire and knocked it out. Here also a 76mm shell (AP) was employed.

All during this action the enemy was dropping harassing artillery fire on the forward elements.

For the remainder of this period there are no other unusual activities to report.

18 January 1945.

#### COMPANY A IN THE LINE

At approximately 0100, a 120mm mortar shell struck Sgt Kline's tank knocking the turret ring and loaders hatch off. One man was wounded in the tank, and while attempting to evacuate, two others were wounded by another mortar shell in the vicinity of the knocked out tank. The tank was still operational, but not in condition for further combat, so Lt Walston ordered the wounded men and the remainder of the tank crew to take the tank back to Battalion Maintenance. This was accomplished after the wounded had been given medical attention.

Lt Saltess reported to Lt Walston at approximately 0330, in the forward area. Lt Saltess had been promoted from Staff Sergeant and had just returned from the Division Rear, where all details had been propounded.

At approximately 0630, Major Comfort, S-3, ordered Lt Walston to move his tanks from present area and support B/23 who were in turn supporting 66 AIB in attack on Herrlisheim. Lt Walston moved his 4 tanks out of his position at coordinates 123142, and while maneuvering to gain new position, one of the tanks broke through an ice-covered hole and submerged in the water well over the hull of the tank, rendering it inoperational. In view of the situation and strong enemy positions, this tank was ordered destroyed, and it was placed out of further use by the enemy. This was at coordinates 122142.

The remaining 3 tanks took positions at coordinates 098128 where they could observe to the east and support by fire the movement of Company B towards Herrlisheim. Flashes from enemy guns were sighted across the highway and west of Offerndorf, and Lt Walston caused artillery fire to be brought on both those guns and enemy doughs sighted moving up the road from Stainwald Woods.

At approximately 1500, orders were received to move back from positions and proceed to Gries, where the Battalion was to remain on the alert for enemy counterattack.

The company closed into Gries at 1715, and the men were fed hot meals and after security was provided for the night, the remaining were permitted to get much needed sleep.

Company A, less the three tanks and crews available for combat, moved to OHLUNGEN to resupply and perform medical attention for men who did not have tanks with which to fight.

No further unusual occurrences for the remainder of this period.

19 January 1945.

#### COMPANY A IN THE LINE

At approximately 0600, Lt Walston was called to the Battalion CP and told to be prepared to move his three tanks out to engage a possible enemy counterattack on Weyersheim. He immediately returned to his tanks and advised the crews of the situation.

Orders were received to move to Weyersheim, and at around 0900 the three tanks from this company had followed B Company into Weyersheim and were awaiting further orders. Positions were reconnoitered for tanks to occupy in support of the Infantry then holding the line in conjunction with C/23. The three tanks were placed at approximately 054127 with guns pointing east, in preparation for possible enemy counterattacks. Due to other tanks from the Battalion being in more forward defensive positions, these tanks were not in any actual fire-fights with the enemy for the remainder of this day.

At 1800, the tanks were withdrawn to Herrlisheim and placed on outpost at the northern tip of the town, at 051137. No enemy action was encountered for the remainder of the period covered.

20 January 1945.

#### COMPANY A IN THE LINE

Tanks remained in the same positions as that indicated for the previous night that day, and no enemy action was encountered for this period.

21 January 1945.

#### COMPANY A IN THE LINE

At approximately 0830, Lt Walston received orders to accompany C Company to woods 0815 and assist the 143d Regiment, 36<sup>th</sup> Infantry Division, there. At about 0900, Sgt Mattinen of this Company was wounded by sniper fire coming from the woods, and his tank was evacuated. This left two tanks remaining in combat condition in this company.

At coordinates 079158, Lt Saltess fired on enemy doughs trying to make their way out of the woods towards Herrlisheim, inflicting numerous casualties. A good many of these enemy doughs surrendered and were sent to PW cage. For this action, the Infantry claimed the capture, but actually the tanks were the expedient resulting in said capture.

At 1630, Lt Walston moved his remaining two tanks to 0815 to support by fire the advance of Company C in their attack to the SW. While at this position Lt Saltess was wounded by enemy

artillery fire and evacuated to the rear. His tank remained operative. Enemy doughs were observed going across Lt Walston's direct front trying to get into woods at coordinates 076150, and after advising Lt Guitteau of this situation, both companies caught these doughs in cross-fire and definitely broke up the attack.

At dusk orders were received to return to Weyersheim, and Lt Walston moved his two tanks to that town.

This concluded operations of this company for the month of January.

At the time of release from front line, there remained only two tanks, commanded by Lt Walston, and seven additional men available from this company for immediate combat.

#### B COMPANY IN THE LINE

##### 16 January 1945.

At 1500, orders were received by the Company Commander, 1<sup>st</sup> Lt John C Lee, Jr., to move his company to Weyersheim and to have an officer precede the column to receive orders there.

Lt Lee placed Lt Perkins in command and proceeded to Weyersheim for orders. Meanwhile, Lt Perkins brought the company forward.

Orders were received from General Ennis by Lt Lee that if his company arrived at Weyersheim in time, they would attack in conjunction with the 66<sup>th</sup> AIB for Stainwald Woods.

The company did not get there in sufficient time to get organized and jump off in such an attack. Darkness came and the company was lined up on the main street of Weyersheim awaiting further orders. Billets were procured for the men to get them under cover.

No other unusual occurrences for this period.

##### 17 January 1945.

At 0100, Lt Lee was ordered to report to CC-A Headquarters, where Lt Col Wells, CC 66<sup>th</sup> AIB, gave the following order:

Attack Stainwald Woods placing one platoon of tanks with one company of Infantry on the right side of the road and one platoon of tanks with a company of Engineers acting as Infantry on the left side of the road. One platoon was to be left in Weyersheim under CC-A.

Due to conditions of the ground, the platoon of tanks on the left were the only ones able to get off the road.

Lt Lee, CO, was with the platoon on the road.

The attack jumped off at 0230 and progressed to an enemy mine field at coordinates 095118, where it was slowed up as composition, disposition, and extent of mine field was unknown to the attacking forces.

At the mine field the Platoon Leader of the Company of the tanks on the road (Lt Perkins) dismounted, located mine field, and endeavored to chop mines out of the ice to gain passage for the tanks. Mines were frozen in the ice and were apparently not buried. Due to the noise of the tanks approaching the woods, the element of surprise was overcome and heavy mortar and artillery fire was brought to bear on the attacking forces. Heavy casualties were inflicted against the dismounted troops through this action.

Lt Perkins continued to chop away mines and eventually had a passage cleared through the mine field. Before further action could be taken by the attacking forces, a heavy barrage of mortar and artillery fire fell on our forces, presumably emanating from the town of Gamsheim, and drove out our foot troops.

Lt Lee ordered his tank commanders to place all wounded Infantrymen they could locate on their tanks and withdraw in back of check point 2. Having accomplished this maneuver, the tanks took up firing positions to dispel any counterattacks from Stainwald Woods.

Infantry withdrew to an approximate line 1000 yards east of Weyersheim, covered by tanks in forward position. Tanks then came back to positions behind Infantry, took up new firing positions and awaited further orders.

At 1200, orders were received from the Infantry Battalion Commander to move B Company into firing positions along road leading from Gamsheim to Herrlisheim and north of Stainwald Woods. We were to be especially watchful for friendly troops passing to our front from South to North (presumably 23<sup>rd</sup> Tank Battalion). The company moved out and progressed to coordinates 110135 where heavy AT fire was received on forward elements. Lt Perkins' tank knocked out and set on fire. No casualties were inflicted against the crew members.

AT gun was sighted at 120128 and artillery was adjusted on this gun, by the Company Commander, knocking it out. Attack progressed for a short distance when cross-fire from AT guns at Herrlisheim and 1221389 was brought to bear against B Company tanks.

Upon Lt Lee's order tanks immediately strived to take defilade positions and the Infantry Battalion Commander was immediately notified of the situation. Orders were to sit tight and await further orders.

At approximately 1700, Company B was told to move in conjunction with 66 AIB to make contact with 17<sup>th</sup> AIB who were known to be in contact with enemy at Herrlisheim. Enroute to the south of Herrlisheim, the 23<sup>rd</sup> Tank Battalion CP was discovered to the west of Herrlisheim, and word was received that the 17<sup>th</sup> AIB was being engaged in the town. At this point the 66<sup>th</sup> AIB and this company took defensive positions within and as a part of the 23<sup>rd</sup> Tank Battalion outer perimeter of defense.

Spasmodic artillery and mortar fire fell on our elements for the remainder of this period.

## B COMPANY IN THE LINE

18 January 1945.

Heavy AT fire forced a withdrawal at dawn this morning to 090130 where positions were again taken up as defensive measure. After that orders were received that this company was returned to 23<sup>rd</sup> Tank Battalion, and for Lt Lee to bring his company back to Weyersheim, thence to Gries, where the men were fed a hot meal and bedded down for the night.

No further unusual activities for this period.

19 January 1945.

At 0600 this date, B Company was alerted for movement to Weyersheim to prevent enemy counterattack.

At 0900 the Company moved out and was assigned a sector of Weyersheim to outpost. This was accomplished without delay.

At approximately 1430, Lt Lee was ordered to move one platoon of tanks to 065120 to repel enemy panzer counterattack. 2d Lt John E Powell, with his 3<sup>rd</sup> Platoon, moved forward and took up firing positions. Five enemy Mark V tanks were knocked out and burned, and the enemy was forced to abandon this attack. Own losses in this action: 2 tanks, with one crew member a casualty.

After it was definitely established the enemy would not counterattack at this point again, Lt Powell was returned to the town with his three remaining tanks and assumed their original outpost positions.

For the remainder of this period, artillery and mortar fire fell spasmodically in and around Weyersheim. January 19

20 January 1945.

At 1600, orders were received to attack east from LD located at 050140. This attack was supposed to be in conjunction with 43<sup>rd</sup> Tank on right and C/23 on north to pinch off panzer counterattack coming from the east. The enemy attack was halted and tanks proceeded to 068138 at which time infantry moved forward and relieved tanks which were withdrawn into Weyersheim.

There were no additional activities for the remainder of this period.

#### 19 January 1945.

At 0600, the Battalion was alerted for attack from the north and east. The CO departed for CC-A at Weyersheim at 0730 and returned at 0830 with orders to move B and A Companies forward into Weyersheim. They moved out at 0915, but when they arrived at coordinates 049140, they were subjected to enemy AT fire from the east. The column returned to Kurtzenhausen, 052155, and awaited orders there. At approximately 1100, they were able to make their way into Weyersheim and were given their orders at that time, which were to outpost the town and prepare to move in any direction to repel enemy counterattack. The actions and orders of the companies for the remainder of this period are shown under specific company activities for this date.

At 1530, the rear CP moved out of Gries and to Kreisheim, where they set up new CP.

At 1900, supplies were sent forward and all companies were gassed up and ammunition was replenished.

Other activities for this date are covered in company reports.

#### 20 January 1945.

At approximately 0300 this date, the Battalion was relieved from CC-A and 12<sup>th</sup> Armored Division and was attached to 36<sup>th</sup> Infantry Division, who were occupying our assigned sector. Tanks were outposting the town and at ready call for the Infantry.

At 1317 the S-4 half-track was sent forward to Weyersheim to establish communications, as the CO and S-3 tank had difficulty with their homelites.

At approximately 1600, Lt Thomas, Reconnaissance Platoon Leader, while attempting to take ammunition forward by towing a trailer with a tank, was lost in action, along with the crew. It is not certain whether they were killed, captured, or wounded; thus they have been carried Missing in Action.

Other activities for this date are covered in company reports.

Major Edwards established personal liaison with the Infantry to which we were attached and personally supervised the movements of the various tank thrusts for this period.

#### 21 January 1945.

At 0925, the Battalion Commander alerted Company D, which was with rear CP at Kreisheim, for movement to forward area. However, at 1154, this alert was cancelled.

At 1000, the S-3 Air, Lt Mowatt, requested information from CC-A as to whether or not we would close down our radio communication with them, and this information was affirmative, so nets were closed.

At 1144, Major Edwards advised the Battalion would be relieved from attachment to the Infantry at 1500, and alerted the Reconnaissance to be used as guides.

At 1400, the rear CP at Kreisheim was making preparations to move to Gougenheim, but this was cancelled when it was learned that relief of the Battalion would not be affected at 1500 as planned.

At 1435, CO ordered D Company to report to forward CP at once, but D Company had already departed for Gougenheim. A messenger was sent to contact them and D Company was turned around and returned to Weyersheim, where Captain Richart reported to Major Edwards.

At 1738, the rear CP at Kreisheim moved to Bietlenheim to join the Battalion as it withdrew from the forward areas. Closed at 1815.

At 2100, the Battalion Commander issued the following order:

“All tanks except those on outpost will assemble vicinity this CP (Weyersheim) in preparation for movement to Gougenheim.

Tanks on outpost will remain in position until notified by me when those tanks which are supposed to relieve us will take over their positions.

23<sup>rd</sup> vehicles move out first, followed by 43<sup>rd</sup>.”

When the relief tanks arrived, our outposts were withdrawn, and at 2132 departed from Weyersheim and marched to Gougenheim. The rear CP and remaining elements joined the column at Bietlenheim.

Upon relief from the Infantry we reverted to CC-B control, and when the Battalion closed we advised them of our location.

Company D meanwhile was attached to the 17<sup>th</sup> Infantry and had duties assigned in placing outposts around an assigned area in the Division Zone.

No further unusual activities for this date.

22 January 1945.

At 0015, Battalion closed in new location at Gougenheim. No vehicular or personnel casualties in spite of slippery roads and deep snow.

At 1110 Major Edwards went to CC-R Headquarters to discuss past engagement.

At 2055, the Executive Officer, CC-R, advised our Battalion Commander that our Battalion was placed on 2-hour alert effective immediately. This information was imparted to all company commanders at a meeting called at 2100. Also at this meeting it was disclosed that we would send Company C to 17<sup>th</sup> AIB and would get Company A, 17<sup>th</sup> AIB in return from them.

No other unusual occurrences for this date.

23 January 1945.

On this date various plans were promulgated and discussed in the event of enemy breakthrough from the east, north, and northeast. These plans are shown on S-2, 3 Journal for this date.

At 1205, we were advised that our Division had been released from 7<sup>th</sup> Army and were attached II French Corps.

At 1330, Lt Gotlieb, 7<sup>th</sup> Army Historical Section, arrived to check on past engagement for historical records.

At 1910, Company D, which had been used to outpost roads in CC-R area, was released from these duties and returned to Battalion control.

At 2120, Captain Clark, CO, Headquarters Company, reported an Aerial Bomb in the attic of one of the billets his men were occupying at Gougenheim. CC-R was immediately advised and the following morning a representative from the Engineer Battalion came tour billets and neutralized the bomb.

No additional unusual occurrences for this date.

24 January 1945.

At 0915, message was phoned to our Headquarters that we were relieved from CC-R and attached to CC-A, and that billeting parties were to be sent to CC-A immediately. Captain Clark, along with his billeting party, departed for CC-A.

At 1015, the CO went to CC-A to determine plans for movement.

At 1315, we were relieved from CC-A and reattached to CC-R. CO returned with this information.

No other unusual activities for this date.

25 January 1945.

At 0900, CC-R phoned and advised a reconnaissance was to be made for billeting purposes in Achenheim, France. At 0925, our billeting parties departed for CC-R Headquarters.

At 1130, preparations were made to move CP and companies to new location, vicinity Achenheim. The S-3 issued movement order as follows:

“This Battalion moves to new billets vicinity Achenheim. Head moved out of this location at 1230. Crosses IP at 1400.

Order of March: Bn Hq, Hq Co, Co B, Co A, Co C, Co C, Serv Co, Med Det.

Rate of March: 13 MPH.  
Route: See my map. (Inclosure S-2, S-3 Journal).  
IP: See my map.  
Other instructions: SOP"

The column moved out of Gougenheim at 1230, and joined CC-R column and crossed IP at Avenheim at 1424. Closed into new area at Achenheim at 1715. No vehicular or personnel casualties.

No other unusual activities for this date.

#### 26 January 1945.

At 0915, small arms inspection was held in all companies. New sights were installed on all carbines by supporting maintenance.

The hours before darkness were utilized by all companies in firing weapons and adjusting sights, then cleaning weapons. An old clay pit on the south of Achenheim was used for firing.

At 1200, plans were discussed for attack towards Kilstett in the event the enemy took that town. These plans appear in S-2, 3 Journal for this date.

At 1730, the CO departed for CC-A to attend a conference held there on past and future operations.

Lt Col Cecil Hill, Division IG, came to this Headquarters to investigate the facts surrounding 17<sup>th</sup> AIB during last operation.

No other unusual occurrences for this date.

#### 27 January 1945.

This day was spent firing weapons and camouflaging tanks with white wash. Snow was very thick on the ground and precautions were being taken to have the tanks blend as much as possible.

At 1433, the CO went to CC-R to check on any new plans. No news.

At 1600, Lt Col Saks, Division CWO, came to Battalion to request our flame thrower tank operator to be used as an instructor the following day. This was granted. No other unusual occurrences for this date.

#### 28 January 1945.

At 1500, a new plan for attack at Kilstett was received, and reconnaissance was made. This plan appears in the Journal.

At 2000, message was received that Company B would dry-run the above plan the following day with 17<sup>th</sup> AIB. Company B was alerted and advised of this procedure.

No other unusual occurrences for this date.

29 January 1945.

At 0500, Company B was officially alerted for dry-run of plan discussed the previous day. This dry-run was to commence at 0800. At 0800, Company B departed with 17<sup>th</sup> AIB.

At 2150, the CO worked out a plan for inspections of vehicles, weapons, and personnel the following morning. This plan included condition of maintenance, questions on the situation, personal appearance, etc. This was later gotten out to all Companies the following morning.

No other unusual occurrences for this date.

30 January 1945.

At 0800, a Company Commanders meeting was held and plans for inspection were revealed. The inspections were to be held commencing at 0930, and the company commanders returned to their companies to advise all personnel.

Inspections were carried on commencing at 0930 and ending at 1700. Most results were excellent.

No other unusual occurrences for this date.

31 January 1945.

The majority of this day was utilized in payment of troops.

Movies were projected in a local beer tavern for all men.

At 1300, all Companies were notified that 1 February would be a holiday, and no schedule would be maintained.

No other unusual occurrences for this date.

Signed

CHARLES A DEAR, Captain, Infantry  
S-2, 23<sup>rd</sup> Tank Battalion

HEADQUARTERS 23<sup>RD</sup> TANK BATTALION  
CASUALTY REPORT – JANUARY 1945

KILLED IN ACTION

<u>Name</u>	<u>Rank</u>	<u>ASN</u>	<u>Date</u>	<u>Location</u>
Edward S Reitano, Jr	2d Lt	01016023	17 Jan 45	Herrlisheim, France R121543

WOUNDED IN ACTION

Wesley F Wilsey	Pvt	32837463	19 Jan 45
Jesse C Oakes	Pvt	38157512	9 Jan 45
Wilton W Svensk	Cpl	37315522	17 Jan 45
Joseph C Boratyn	Tec 4	33393626	13 Jan 45
Merle F Parrish	Cpl	20846763	17 Jan 45
Willard J Smith	Cpl	36534681	17 Jan 45
Ralph R Ritter	Pvt	33671965	17 Jan 45
Warren G Watson	Tec 5	36533225	17 Jan 45
Jack W Campbell	Pvt	15140653	17 Jan 45
Kenneth L Brown	Pfc	18214500	17 Jan 45
Leslie B Miller	S/Sgt	14038280	17 Jan 45
Vincent A Panzone	Cpl	32547598	17 Jan 45
Melvin L Stephenson	Tec 4	39110511	17 Jan 45
James D Wells	Pvt	38278500	17 Jan 45
Patrick Flammia	Cpl	31297922	17 Jan 45
Theodore A Stevens	Tec 4	37315820	18 Jan 45
James T Choate	Tec 5	38508831	18 Jan 45
Edward V Kline	Sgt	32683151	18 Jan 45
Jack W Breuer	Cpl	36813152	18 Jan 45
Roy M Wrenn	Cpl	32685678	22 Jan 45
Charles A Rigler	Cpl	36762197	17 Jan 45
Sam J Bumgarner	S/Sgt	34258522	18 Jan 45
Donald D Dietz	Pvt	33501775	20 Jan 45
Michael J Soltes	Pvt	31333485	23 Jan 45
Jack P Begy	Pvt	12172576	10 Jan 45
Ernest H Garneau	1 <sup>st</sup> Lt	01013626	17 Jan 45
Joseph S Yoniack	Tec 4	32529645	17 Jan 45
Andrew F Woods	Pfc	36406243	18 Jan 45
George W Cox	Cpl	36362822	18 Jan 45
William H Costello	Tec 5	37315490	20 Jan 45
Ruble G Stacy	Pfc	39400289	19 Jan 45
Anthony Scorpio	Sgt	31051116	19 Jan 45
Paul E Stalter	Cpl	35423298	19 Jan 45
Albert G Osuch	Tec 4	32576792	19 Jan 45
Edward P Vickless	S/Sgt	33399190	21 Jan 45

WOUNDED IN ACTION (Continued)

<u>Name</u>	<u>Rank</u>	<u>ASN</u>	<u>Date</u>	<u>Location</u>
Benjamin L Knell	Tec 4	121333213	19 Jan 45	
Robert J Keins	Pvt	36955414	21 Jan 44	
Harvey L Blount	Pfc	34971579	17 Jan 45	
Delbert L Howard	Pfc	33465278	18 Jan 45	
Stephen Pehanich	Pfc	33460139	18 Jan 45	
Jack L Buckingham	Tec 4	32484502	19 Jan 45	
Ralph L Smith	Pfc	36663642	21 Jan 45	
James T Bridges	Pfc	33722824	21 Jan 45	

MISSING IN ACTION

<u>Rank</u>	<u>Name</u>	<u>ASN</u>	<u>Date</u>
Capt	Albert C Lange, Jr	01 013 386	17 Jan 45
2d Lt	Charles P Thomas	01 019 239	21 Jan 45
Sgt	William E Brown	32 528 081	17 Jan 45
Sgt	Frank S Chruma	39 838 322	17 Jan 45
Sgt	Robert E Entwisle	16 112 055	17 Jan 45
Sgt	Patrick J Ryan	35 353 258	17 Jan 45
Sgt	Elmo Varney	6 984 390	17 Jan 45
Tec 4	Cleaborn H Dellinger	34 300 783	17 Jan 45
Cpl	George W Russell	37 336 300	17 Jan 45
Tec 5	Robert J Amiot	11 101 793	17 Jan 45
Tec 5	Albin J Dolence	35 529 870	17 Jan 45
Pfc	Bjarne Braaten	36 275 766	17 Jan 45
Pfc	Francis J Cranmer	32 365 501	17 Jan 45
Pvt	Kenneth C Ehman	35 093 442	17 Jan 45
Pvt	Floyd A Griffith	35 563 016	17 Jan 45
Pvt	James R Jackson	15 045 791	17 Jan 45
Pvt	Harlan M Pick	12 225 450	17 Jan 45
Pvt	Jerome J Rebhun	12 221 341	17 Jan 45
Sgt	Harvey R Mattinen	37 273 928	21 Jan 45
Tec 4	Gerald D Wees	37 316 651	20 Jan 45
Cpl	Jay J Newcomb, Jr	32 526 717	20 Jan 45
Pvt	Claude J Barge	34 150 399	20 Jan 45

HEADQUARTERS 23<sup>RD</sup> TANK BATTALION

OFFICERS ROSTER – January 1945

<u>Rank</u>	<u>Full Name</u>	<u>ASN</u>	<u>Transfers and Special Duties</u>
<u>Battalion Headquarters</u>			
Major	William A Edwards	0 351 514	
Major	Jerome W Schrader	0 456 103	
Major	William R Comfort	0 450 264	
Capt	Alan L Hann	01 012 557	
1 <sup>st</sup> Lt	John L Mowatt	01 013 378	
1 <sup>st</sup> Lt	Carleton B Lucas	01 017 716	
Capt	Charles A Dear	01 012 605	
2d Lt	Robert A von Doenhoff	01 315 117	
Capt	Alan L Hann	01 012 557	From dy to trfd to 7 <sup>th</sup> Army Det of Pat on 5 Jan 45.
2d Lt	John T McBride	0 547 636	Asgnd & jd fr Co B, this Bn on 5 Jan 45. Duty changed to 1930-6 on 7 Jan 45.
Capt	Alan L Hann	01 012 557	From trfd to 7 <sup>th</sup> Army Det of Pat to duty on 7 Jan 45.
Capt	William R Comfort	0 450 264	Promoted to Gr of Maj on 1 Jan 45 per par 1, SO 1, Hq, 7 <sup>th</sup> Army dtd 1 Jan 45.
Capt	Virgil L Thorp	01 010 513	From trfd to 7 <sup>th</sup> Army Det of Pat to duty, 13 Jan 45.
Capt	Virgil L Thorp	01 010 513	from dy to Hosp as of 26 Jan 45.
<u>Headquarters Company</u>			
1 <sup>st</sup> Lt	Joseph C Watson, Jr.	01 014 750	
1 <sup>st</sup> Lt	James H Wiedenhoef	01 015 907	
2d Lt	Philip R Beach	01 018 214	
2d Lt	John E Powell	01 019 120	
2d Lt	Charles P Thomas	01 019 239	
Capt	John C Clark	0 239 37	Asgn & jd fr Hq, 7 <sup>th</sup> Army as of 31 Dec 44.
Capt	John C Clark	0 239 37	Assumes duties of Co Comdr as of 3 Jan 45, Prin Dy changed to 2900-7
Capt	John E Powell	01 019 120	Trfd to Co B, this Bn, as of 5 Jan 45.
2d Lt	Charles P Thomas	01 019 239	From dy to Missing in Action as of 21 Jan 45, Dropped fr the rolls, 29 Jan 45.

<u>Rank</u>	<u>Full Name</u>	<u>ASN</u>	<u>Transfers and Special Duties</u>
<u>Medical Detachment</u>			
1 <sup>st</sup> Lt	Bernard S Feinberg	01 533 778	
		No changes	
<u>Service Company</u>			
Capt	James P Thomas, Jr	01 010 489	
Capt	Joseph R Tomkinson	01 010 418	
2d Lt	Herman E Gerhard	01 018 685	
2d Lt	Walter J Little	01 031 571	
CWO	Merle W Brooks	W2 123 073	
CWO	Raymond R Richardson	W2 123 153	
WOJG	Ronald Sutherland	W2 135 352	
		No Changes	
<u>Company A</u>			
Capt	Albert C Lange, Jr	01 013 386	
1 <sup>st</sup> Lt	Robert E Seymour	01 015 827	
1 <sup>st</sup> Lt	Howard T Rahe	01 018 181	
2d Lt	Cecil D Walston	01 017 342	
2d Lt	Owsley C Costlow	01 019 221	
1 <sup>st</sup> Lt	Robert E Seymour	01 015 827	From dy to Trfd to 7 <sup>th</sup> Army Det of Pat as of 9 Jan 45.
2d Lt	Owsley C Costlow	01 019 221	Asgnd dy as Tank Plat O as of 18 Dec 44.
2d Lt	Alex Saltess	02 000 816	Asgd & jd from Hq, 12 <sup>th</sup> Armd Div per par 2, SO 12, Hq, 12 <sup>th</sup> AD as of 16 Jan 45.
Capt	Albert C Lange, Jr.	01 013 386	Fr duty to MIA in France as of 17 Jan 45. Dropped from the rolls.
2d Lt	Cecil D Walston	01 017 342	Assmd temp comd of co as of 17 Jan 45.
1 <sup>st</sup> Lt	Howard T Rahe	01 018 181	Assmd comd of co as of 21 Jan 45. Prin duty changed to 1203-7.
<u>Company B</u>			
1 <sup>st</sup> Lt	John C Lee, Jr	0 444 563	
1 <sup>st</sup> Lt	Harry Basse	01 015 542	
2d Lt	John T McBride	0 547 636	
2d Lt	David W. McBride	0 547 635	

<u>Rank</u>	<u>Full Name</u>	<u>ASN</u>	<u>Transfers and Special Duties</u>
<u>Company B (continued)</u>			
2d Lt	Francis L Perkins	01 018 137	Fr trfd to 7 <sup>th</sup> Army Det of Pat to duty as of 3 Jan 45.
2d Lt	John E Powell	01 019 120	Asgn & jd fr Hq Co, this Bn, as of 5 Jan 45.
2d Lt	John T McBride	0 547 636	Trfd to Bn Hq, this Bn, as of 5 Jan 45.
2d Lt	Sylvester H Brinker	02 006 408	Asgn & jd fr Hq, 12 <sup>th</sup> Armd Div per Par 6, SO 18, 12 <sup>th</sup> Armd Div as of 21 Jan 45.

Company C

1 <sup>st</sup> Lt	Wayne F Guitteau	01 013 625	
1 <sup>st</sup> Lt	Ernest H Garneau	01 013 626	
2d Lt	Edward S Reitano, Jr	01 016 023	Killed in action, 17 Jan 45.
2d Lt	James T Sadler, Jr	0 526 676	
2d Lt	Henry S Andersen	01 017 179	
2d Lt	James T Sadler, Jr	0 526 676	Asgnd duties as Tank Plat O as of 16 Dec 44.
1 <sup>st</sup> Lt	Wayne F Guitteau	01 013 625	Assumed Comd of Co as of 17 Jan 45. Prin duty changed to 1203-7.
1 <sup>st</sup> Lt	Ernest H Garneau	01 013 626	Reld of Comd of Co as of 17 Jan 45. Wounded in action, trfd to Gen Hosp, 17 Jan 45.

Company D

Capt	Harry T Richart, Jr	01 012 729	
1 <sup>st</sup> Lt	James J Stowe	01 013 741	
2d Lt	Raleigh B West	01 017 462	
2d Lt	James F Connolly	01 013 494	
2d Lt	Anthony Pawloski	01 017 046	

No changes